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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 950109-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

KENT WALTER BINGHAM,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Kent Walter Bingham appeals his convictions
for theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and for unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor under
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1994).

The convictions were entered

upon jury verdicts in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable David S. Young,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court properly find that the State

presented credible, race-neutral reasons for removing an AfricanAmerican and a Hispanic prospective juror via peremptory strikes?
Under settled law, appellate courts grant high deference to such
rulings, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous.
Hernandez

v. New York,

See

500 U.S. 352, 364-70 (1991) (detailed

explanation why "clear error" standard applies).

Accord

State

v.

Cantu,

778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State

543, 545 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
State v.

Harrison,

v.

Macial,

854 P.2d

862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993);
denied,

805 P.2d 769, 778 (Utah App.), cert,

817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
II.

Did the trial court properly overrule Bingham's

objection to an alleged prosecutorial misstatement of law in
closing argument?

The question whether a prosecutor misstated

the law is apparently viewed without deference, e.g.,
Boyatt,

State

854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

1356 (Utah 1993).

v.

862 P.2d

However, the question whether prosecutorial

misstatement or misconduct warrants a mistrial is reviewed with
great deference to the trial court's ruling.
Hay,

859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner,

287 (Utah 1989), cert,
Speer,

See, e.g.,

denied,

State

789 P.2d 273,

494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State

750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v.

848, 853 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied,

v.

Cummins,

v.

839 P.2d

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)

(all stating "abuse of discretion" standard).

A similarly

deferential standard should apply to rulings on objections
claiming prosecutorial misstatement.
III.

Did the trial court properly deny Bingham's

mistrial motion, made in response to a prospective juror's voir
dire admission that she had previously viewed Bingham in another
court, wearing jail clothing?

A deferential, "abuse of

discretion" standard applies to this issue as well.
State

v.

Menzies,

See,

889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert,

115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v.

Wetzel,
2

e.g.,

denied,

868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah

1993); State v. Gordon,
v. Morgan,

886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994); State

865 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Utah App. 1993); State v.

839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert,

denied,

Burk,

862 P.2d 1356

(Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Bingham invokes U.S. CONST, amend XIV § 1, and UTAH CONST.
art. I § 24 in support of his arguments.

Those provisions are

copied in addendum A to his Brief of Appellant.

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 76-6-401 (1995), and 76-6-402, and 76-6-408 (1995), defining
theft and theft by receiving, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311
and 41-la-1314 (1993), defining "joyriding," are copied in the
appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bingham was charged with one count of theft by
receiving stolen property, classified as a second degree felony
because the stolen item was an automobile, see Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (1995), and with one count of unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 810).

A jury found him guilty on both counts (R. 150-51).

Bingham was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years imprisonment on the
theft charge, and to six months in jail on the paraphernalia
charge, to be served concurrently; fines and surcharges were also
imposed (R. 161-62) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts supporting Bingham's convictions are recited
in verdict-favoring light.

State

v. Verde,
3

770 P.2d 116, 117

(Utah 1989).

Ms. Jackie Redmon's 1979 Datsun 280-ZX automobile

was taken without permission from the parking lot of a
convenience store, located southwest of Salt Lake City, on a
September evening (R. 250-52, 255). Ms. Redmon had left the
vehicle with its key in the ignition, intending to run a brief
errand in the store (R. 251).
Roughly seven hours later, a police officer observed
the Datsun being driven erratically by Bingham, still in the
southwest area of the Salt Lake Valley (R. 260). The officer
confronted Bingham after he parked the Datsun, bumping another
vehicle in the process (R. 261). A routine computer check
revealed a stolen vehicle report on the vehicle, and Bingham, who
initially gave a false name, was arrested (R. 263-64) .

Several

syringes and a bent spoon were found behind the Datsun's seat,
and were seized (R. 278)- 1
Contacted to retrieve her vehicle, Ms. Redmon saw that
the Datsun's license plates had been removed and substituted with
other plates (R. 252). A distinctive sticker on the Datsun had
been covered, and personal items, including a stereo set, had
been removed (R. 252-53).

Some cotton swabs, a pocket knife, and

spilled beer, not belonging to Ms. Redmon, were also found in the
Datsun (R. 254). Although nearly empty when taken, the Datsun's
gas tank was full when recovered (R. 254).
lAfter the stop, Bingham appeared confused, and was only
partially responsive to officer commands (R. 262-63, 274). At one
point, he got back into the Datsun and reached into the area where
the syringes were found, prompting a concern about hidden weapons
(R. 275-76) .
4

At his trial, Bingham testified that he "stole" the
Datsun from the convenience store, and that he had switched the
license plates and covered the window sticker in order to avoid
detection (R. 324-25, 328). He also admitted that he was a
heroin addict, and had driven the Datsun to Pioneer Park, in Salt
Lake City, to purchase heroin on the evening of the theft. He
obtained funds for the heroin by shoplifting and then selling
several cartons of cigarettes (R. 313-14, 324-25).

His ensuing

intoxication impaired his driving ability, leading to his
apprehension (R. 328-29) .
Bingham testified that it had not been his intention to
permanently keep the Datsun; rather, he claimed that he had
planned to abandon it (R. 329-32).

On cross-examination,

however, Bingham admitted that he required a vehicle for his
daily trips to purchase heroin (R. 333-34).

On redirect

examination, Bingham further admitted that he had permanently
abandoned his own automobile, because it no longer functioned (R.
340-41).
The jury found Bingham guilty of theft by receiving and
possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 150-51).

Bingham appeals.

Other facts pertaining to Bingham's assignments of error will be
set forth under the pertinent argument points of this brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly determined that the State's
peremptory strikes of two minority-race jurors were motivated by
credible, race-neutral concerns.
5

Under settled federal and state

precedent, such a credibility-based determination is reviewed
only for "clear error."

There being no such error in this case,

the trial court's judgment on this point must be affirmed.
Bingham's objection to the prosecutor's alleged
misstatement of law in closing argument was also properly
overruled.

The objected-to statement accurately conveyed that

misdemeanor "joyriding" is limited by a twenty-four hour period
of unlawful vehicle use.

In argument, the prosecutor was

permitted to contrast familiar, prankish joyriding with Bingham's
actions, to persuade the jury that Bingham intended to steal, not
joyride, the vehicle in question.

Additionally, the prosecutor's

statement was more prejudicial to the State than to the defense,
because it suggested that Bingham, who only kept the vehicle for
seven hours, could not have stolen it.
Finally, the trial court properly rejected Bingham's
argument that a mistrial was required because a single
prospective juror admitted, during open voir dire, that she had
previously seen Bingham wearing jail attire.

Comparison to other

cases involving juror views of defendants in restraints or jail
clothing confirms that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Bingham's mistrial motion.

Further, the

jurors' awareness of the prior sighting was harmless, given the
trial court's admonition to disregard it, and because Bingham
severely prejudiced himself with his own trial testimony.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED BINGHAM'S
"BATSON" OBJECTIONS TO THE STATE'S USE OF TWO
PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST MINORITY-RACE
PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Bingham first urges this Court to overturn the trial
court's finding that two State's peremptory strikes, removing
minority-race prospective jurors, were legitimately exercised in
race-neutral fashion (R. 233-34).
associated with Batson

v. Kentucky,

Under the line of cases
476 U.S. 79 (1986), racial

discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes is prohibited by
federal equal protection principles.

One improper peremptory

strike constitutes cause to reverse a criminal conviction; no
"harmless error" is possible.
Pharris,

Batson,

476 U.S. at 100; State

846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App.), cert,

denied,

v.

857 P.2d

948 (Utah 1993) .
A.

The Standard of Review.
The State did not contest whether Bingham had made a

prima facie showing of improper discrimination under Batson

(R.

23 0-31) . Accordingly, this Court need only review whether the
trial court properly found that the prosecutor's explanations for
the State's peremptory challenges were race-neutral and credible,
defeating the claim of improper discrimination.
York,

500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991); State v. Harrison,

777 (Utah App.), cert,

denied,

Hernandez

805 P.2d 769,

817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

7

v. New

As set

forth in this brief's statement of issues, such a ruling is
reversed on appeal only if "clearly erroneous."2
Bingham urges more intrusive review of peremptory
strikes under article I § 24, the "uniform operation of laws"
provision of the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 17-18).
He does not specify whether such review should apply in the trial
court, on appeal, or both.

In either case, that bid should be

rejected, first, because Bingham never advanced it in the trial
court.

State

v. Bobo,

803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has expressly held
that a "clear error" standard of appellate review applies.
Hernandez,

500 U.S. at 364-70.

appellate courts.

State

v.

That holding binds Utah's

Thurman,

2

846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah

The State agrees that the question whether the peremptorily
struck juror is the same race as the party challenging the strike
is irrelevant. Powers v. Ohio,
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 1364
(1991) (Br. of Appellant at 22). Therefore, the State's appellate
analysis, like the trial prosecutor's response to Bingham's
challenges, disregards the trial court's finding that Bingham has
a different racial heritage than the jurors in question.
8

1993) .3 Applying these standards, the trial court properly
rejected Bingham's objections to the State's peremptory strikes.
B.

Panelist Judith Gonzales.
Bingham accurately recounts his objection to the

State's peremptory strike of Mrs. Gonzales, who the State
conceded "could be hispanic" (R. 231; Br. of Appellant at 20-21).
Cf.

State

v. Span,

819 P.2d 329, 340-42 (Utah 1991) (perception

of panelist as racial minority suffices to press Batson

claim).

The prosecutor explained that "the most important factor" driving
his decision to strike Gonzales was his "perception of her mental
processes as she perceived the [voir dire] questions and manner
she answered them, the halting, hesitating manner in which she
answered them" (R. 233). Gonzales had been "a bit slow and
halting, her speech pattern seemed to be that she had to think
about things a little bit and the State was concerned whether she

3

More intrusive review of peremptory strikes under state
"uniform operation" principles could cause race-based preferential
seating of certain jurors, by granting extra, race-based insulation
against peremptory removal. That, in turn, could violate federal
equal protection law.

See Adarand

Constructors,

Inc.

v.

Pena,

U.S.
, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113
(1995) ("[A] 11 racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny").
Even when a prima facie case of race-based strikes is made,
the burden remains on the challenging party to prove actual racial
discrimination. Hernandez,
500 U.S. at 360. Race-neutral reasons
for peremptory strikes need not be related to the case at bar.
Purkett
v. Elam,
U.S.
, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). To
the extent that State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 342 (Utah 1991) and
State v. Cantu, 778 P. 2d 517, 518-19 (1989) suggest otherwise (Br.
of Appellant at 20), they conflict with controlling United States
Supreme Court explanations of Batson challenges.
9

would be able to grasp what the State is going to present,
particularly closing arguments" (R. 232).
Bingham argues on appeal, as he did in the trial court,
that the prosecutor's explanation for striking Mrs. Gonzales
based upon her level of education seemed inconsistent with other
jurors whom the State did not strike (R. 232-33; Br. of Appellant
at 21). To that argument, the prosecutor responded that he had
factored both education plus type of employment into his use of
peremptory strikes (R. 233). However he may criticise that
response, Bingham never took issue with the prosecutor's
assessment of Mrs. Gonzales' "slow and halting" speech pattern,
and his "most important" concern that she might not readily
understand the State's case.
Ultimately, the trial court found the prosecutor's
justification for striking Mrs. Gonzales to be both race-neutral
and credible.

See

Batson,

476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (trial court's

resolution of objection "largely will turn on evaluation of
credibility").4

The "clear error" appellate review standard

comtemplates that "[w]here there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous."
Bessemer

City,

Hernandez,

500 U.S. at 369 (quoting Anderson

470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

4

v.

This Court must

So long as it is race-neutral, a party's explanation for a
challenged peremptory strike can be "silly or superstitious;" if
such explanation is believed, the strike must be upheld by the
trial court. Purkett
v. Elam, fn. 3 of this brief, 115 S. Ct. at
1771.
10

therefore uphold the trial court's finding that the State
peremptorily removed Mrs. Gonzales for race-neutral reasons.
C.

Panelist Adrian Sampson.
Prospective juror Sampson, an African-American (R.

231) , stated during voir dire that even his attendance at the
relatively brief, two-day trial could have difficult financial
consequences.

Paid by commission for his employment, and nearing

the end of his probationary period, Mr. Sampson had "quite a bit
of money on the line" that required his close attention at the
time (R. 208-09) . Additionally, Mr. Sampson acknowledged his
personal acquaintance with some lawyers employed by the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association (R. 222-23) . For these reasons, the
prosecutor peremptorily struck Mr. Sampson:
And the concern was, is that if he's chosen and
that if he spends most of his time worrying about
his work, he'll spend [sic: less?] time worrying
about this particular case. He, in great detail,
went into why he would consider it a hardship.
Additionally, he stated that he knew people
at L.D.A., specifically Richard Uday, and he knew
Andrew Valdez before he became a judge.
(R. 231).
Bingham asserts that another prospective juror, Mrs.
Davie, had similar employment concerns yet was not peremptorily
removed, suggesting that the prosecutor's concerns about Mr.
Sampson were pretextual (Br. of Appellant at 27).

In fact,

however, Davie's job concern was not so strong as that of Mr.
Sampson:

she merely reported that in her job as a clothing sales

clerk, she had to preside over a sale beginning at 5:00 p.m. each
11

day of trial (R. 209-10).

And Mrs. Davie, unlike Sampson, had no

association with criminal defense lawyers.

The prosecutor

therefore acted reasonably in striking Mr. Sampson, while leaving
Mrs. Davie on the jury.
The trial court, in turn, was permitted to believe the
prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking Mr. Sampson.
On appeal, Bingham only argues that certain factors "support Mr.
Bingham's position" or "suggest[]" that the prosecutor's
explanation was false (Br. of Appellant at 26-27).

Such

arguments, while properly made in the trial court, do not meet
the "clear error" standard for appellate reversal.5 Again, the
trial court's on-scene advantage in assessing the prosecutor's
credibility must prevail. Accordingly, this Court must affirm
the trial court's finding that the State struck Mr. Sampson, like
Ms. Gonzales, for race-neutral reasons.
POINT TWO
IN OVERRULING BINGHAM'S OBJECTION TO THE
PROSECUTOR'S ALLEGED MISSTATEMENT OF LAW, THE
TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED NOR CAUSED
PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENSE
Bingham next complains that the prosecutor misstated
the law during closing argument.

5

The challenged statement

Bingham's appellate analysis, applying the tests set forth
for Batson challenges in Span, 819 P. 2d at 342, and Cantu, 778 P. 2d
at 518, is really a more elaborate form of his trial court
argument. Because he makes no claim that the trial court stepped
outside the "pasture" created by those cases, State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 939-40 n.5 (Utah 1994), Bingham's argument cannot
establish clear error in the trial court's resolution of his Batson
objections. Cf. A. Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REV.
325, 333 ("jury argument" on appeal does not prevail).
12

involved the distinction between theft, which requires intent to
permanently deprive a person of their property, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-401(3), -404 (1995), and "joyriding," Utah Code Ann. §§ 41la-1311, -1314 (1993) (all copied in the appendix to this brief),
which only involves temporary deprivation.6

According to

Bingham, the following prosecutor argument improperly suggested
that a twenty-four hour period governed the distinction between
theft and joyriding:
Mr. Bingham has told you yes, he intended to go
down and get the drugs and then abandon the
vehicle.
So basically, Mr. Bingham has convicted
himself of count 2 [(instr. 20)], the unlawful
possession and the unlawful, or the unlawful
control over a motor vehicle, a class A. No
question.
But that's where he wants you to stop and
that's where the people of Utah don't want you to
stop. We want you to look at [instr.] No. 18 and
come back with a verdict of guilty because he
intended to deprive the owner of that motor
vehicle. Why? How? First of all, as you heard
me just explain, unlawful control over a motor
vehicle in the legal jargon is called joy-riding.
Joy-riding is where, generally, a couple of kids
see a motor vehicle, many cases just like this, at
a convenience store, somebody's run in, left the
motor running, the key's in there, they grab it,
they drive over to a friend's house, they ride
around town for a little bit and they abandon it
within a 24-hour period.
(R. 352) . Bingham objected to the foregoing argument, asserting,
"That's not the state of the law" (id.).

6

The trial court

The formal legal term for "joyriding" is "unlawful control
over motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers." Utah Code Ann. §§
41-la-1311, -1314 (1993) .
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overruled the objection, stating that the prosecutor was arguing
the application of the jury instructions (R. 352-53).
A.

The Standard of Review.
The question whether a prosecutor misstated the law can

properly be reviewed without deference to the trial court.
e.g.,

State

denied,

v.

Boyatt,

854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah App.), cert.

862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).

However, attorneys are given

"considerable latitude in closing argument."

State

v.

839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v.
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied,
1993).

See,

Cummins,

Dibello,

780

853 P.2d 897 (Utah

Accordingly, counsel efforts to illustrate the meaning of

an instruction to a trial jury ought to allow similar latitude.
Additionally, when a trial court is asked to grant a
mistrial based upon prosecutor misconduct, its resolution of such
request is reviewed under a deferential "abuse of discretion"
See, e.g., State

standard.
State v.

Speer,

v.

Hay,

859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993);

750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v.

789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
(1990); Cummins,

839 P.2d at 853.

Gardner,

494 U.S. 1090

A similar standard should

apply to rulings on objections, short of a mistrial request, to
alleged misstatements.

Cf.

State

v.

Tillman,

750 P.2d 546, 561

(Utah 1987) (upon timely objection, trial court can correct
erroneous argument by curative instruction or by declaring
mistrial) .

Such deference is also implicit in the appellate test

for whether counsel's comments warrant reversal:

"[D]id the

remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they
14

would not be justified in considering . . . , and were they, under
State

the circumstances, probably influenced by those remarks."
v.

Troy,

688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (followed

in Cummins, 839

P.2d at 852)).
Also implicit in the Troy test for improper prosecutor
comments is a harmless error test.

Therefore, even if this Court

finds error in the trial court's discretionary ruling, it must
nevertheless affirm Bingham's conviction unless he proves
prejudice; i.e., that but for the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more defense-favorable verdict.

State

v.

770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).

Verde,
As

follows, the trial court properly denied Bingham's objection to
the prosecutor's argument.

However, even if the court erred,

such error was not prejudicial.
B.

No Abuse of Discretion.
In fact, the prosecutor correctly stated the law of

"joyriding" as applied to the facts of this case.

The jury was

instructed to consider the lesser-included offense of class A
misdemeanor joyriding, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993) , if it
could not find Bingham guilty of theft (R. 133 (instr. 20)).
Joyriding, however, becomes a third degree felony under section
41-la-1314 if the offender "does not return the motor vehicle . .
. to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the
exercise of unauthorized control."

Because Bingham only kept Ms.

Redmon's Datsun for about seven hours before he was apprehended,

15

the prosecutor's closing argument accurately defined misdemeanor
"joyriding" to the jury.
Given the wide latitude permitted in closing argument,
the prosecutor also legitimately illustrated joyriding by its
most familiar example--young people "borrowing" an automobile
without permission.

Utilizing the evidence in this case, the

prosecutor then distinguished common joyriding from Bingham's
actions--which included switching the license plates and covering
the distinctive window sticker (R. 356). He went on to argue
that Bingham's claimed intention to abandon the Datsun was selfserving and not credible, given that he was apprehended while
still driving it, far from where he purportedly intended to
abandon it (R. 354, 357, 360).
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by overruling Bingham's objection to the
prosecutor's argument.

The court properly allowed latitude for

both parties' counsel to argue the only disputed issue in the
case--whether Bingham took the Datsun with intent to permanently,
or only temporarily, deprive Ms. Redmon.

This Court should

affirm, not second-guess, the trial court's judgment call on this
point.

See State

v. Richardson,

843 P.2d 517, 524-25 (Utah App.

1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring).
C.

Hannlessness of Alleged Error.
Attempting to prove that the prosecutor's allegedly

improper argument prejudiced the defense, Bingham misrelies on
the jury's brief confusion, shown in a note to the court during
16

deliberations, about the time period necessary to differentiate
theft from "joyriding" (Br. of Appellant at 31) . The jury asked
whether "permanent" deprivation of the rightful owner's property
was marked by a period of more than twenty-four hours (R. 146).
Based upon that jury inquiry, Bingham argues that but for the
prosecutor's reference to a twenty-four hour period, the jury
would have found him guilty of joyriding, not theft.
Bingham is mistaken.

The prosecutor's comment could

only have prejudiced the State, not Bingham.

It was undisputed

that Bingham only kept the Datsun for about seven hours. The
prosecutor's "twenty-four hours" comment therefore would have
suggested to the jury that Bingham could not have committed
theft, but only joyriding.

Fortunately for the State, the jury

ultimately understood that the question whether Bingham

intended

to permanently deprive Ms. Redmon of her Datsun, a matter
addressing only Bingham's state of mind, was independent of how
long he actually had possession of the vehicle.

In other words,

had the prosecutor never mentioned a twenty-four hour period,
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more defense-favorable
verdict; instead, the jury would have reached its theft verdict
more easily and rapidly.
And Bingham grossly understates the strength of the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict (Br. of Appellant at 31).
In addition to switching the license plates and covering the
window sticker, there was ample additional evidence of Bingham's
intent to permanently deprive Ms. Redmon of her automobile.
17

By

admitting that he shoplifted and then sold cigarettes on the
evening in question, Bingham painted himself as a thief (R. 31314, 324-25).

Filling the Datsun's gas tank (R. 254, never

asserted as an altruistic act) also supported the inference that
Bingham had no intention to return it.
Bingham's admission that he needed a vehicle on a daily
basis, yet had abandoned his own nonfunctioning automobile (R.
333-34, 340-41), also supported a finding that he intended to
steal the Datsun.

Bingham stole and sold cigarettes to purchase

heroin; a similar fate could be anticipated for the Datsun.
Finally, by giving a false name to the arresting officer (R.
263), Bingham revealed himself as a liar.

All this evidence

permitted the jury to reject Bingham's protestations that he only
intended to use Ms. Redmon's vehicle temporarily.

In sum,

Bingham shows neither error nor prejudice in the trial court's
resolution of his objection to the prosecutor's argument.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED BINGHAM'S
CONTENTION THAT BECAUSE ONE PROSPECTIVE JUROR
HAD SEEN BINGHAM WEARING JAIL GARB, THE JURY
WAS PREJUDICED AGAINST HIM
In his final point on appeal, Bingham requests a new
trial because a prospective juror had apparently viewed him
wearing jail clothing.

During open voir dire, panelist DeRosier

revealed that she had seen Bingham thus clad in another court (R.
198-200; Br. of Appellant at 7-8). Upon Bingham's sidebar
objection, the trial court admonished the panelists that such
sighting of Bingham did not signify guilt of any crime, much less
18

the charges in question.

The panelists uniformly indicated that

they would obey that admonition (R. 201-02; Br. of Appellant at
8-9).

The trial court excused panelist DeRosier for cause, and

denied Bingham's subsequent mistrial motion, made in chambers and
based upon DeRosier's prior sighting (R. 103, 236).7
A.

The Standard of Review.
Utah appellate courts review trial court rulings on

mistrial motions under the deferential, "abuse of discretion"
standard.
denied,

State

889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert.

115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State

(Utah 1993); State
State v. Morgan,
Pearson,

v. Menzies,

v. Gordon,

v. Wetzel,

868 P.2d 64, 70

886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994);

865 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Utah App. 1993); State v.

818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991).

The reviewing

courts have therefore upheld the denial of mistrial motions in
cases where jurors viewed the defendant in shackles during a
trial recess, Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 70; where a seated juror made
an improperly prejudicial comment to another juror, Morgan,

865

P.2d at 1381; and where a juror allegedly gave an inaccurate
response to voir dire questioning, State

v. Ewell,

883 P.2d 1360,

1362 (Utah App. 1993) . This Court has incorporated a "fair
trial" inquiry into such review.

7

E.g.,

State

v. Burk,

839 P.2d

In chambers, the trial court observed that counsel had not
requested a mistrial when objecting at sidebar (R. 235). While
this Court may affirm the trial court's apparent waiver ruling, the
State opts, in main text, to brief this point on the merits.
The State infers that DeRosier was excused for cause from the
main record, which contains the notation "excused" next to
DeRosier's name, followed by the trial judge's initials (R. 103).
19

880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied,
1993); State
B.

v. Boone,

853 P.2d 897 (Utah

820 P.2d 930, 935-36 (Utah App. 1991).

No Abuse of Discretion.
Comparison of this case to similar situations confirms

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Bingham's mistrial motion.

In Wetzel,

for example, mistrial was

properly denied even though an actually seated juror and an
alternate juror viewed the defendant in shackles during a trial
recess.

In this case, no seated juror saw Bingham in jail

clothing; there was only a prior sighting by a panelist who did
not sit.

In Morgan,

mistrial was properly denied when a seated

juror made a "poor taste" comment, suggestive of the defendant's
guilt, to an alternate juror; replacement of the commenting juror
with the alternate juror cured the problem.8

In this case,

panelist DeRosier never commented about Bingham's guilt or
innocence; her for-cause removal also removed any possible
prejudice from having previously viewed him in jail garb.
The sound exercise of the trial court's discretion in
this case is further confirmed by the curative admonition given
to the panelists.

The court made it abundantly clear that jurors

were not to be influenced by DeRosier's sighting of Bingham in
jail clothing.

Polled by show of hands, no panelist expressed

any difficulty with that simple directive.
State,

Compare Dickson

v.

822 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Nev. 1992) (prospective juror saw the
8

A seated juror also overheard the derogatory comment in
Morgan; like the alternate juror, she reaffirmed her impartiality,
and remained on the jury. 865 P.2d at 1381.
20

accused in shackles; one juror admitted that it would be "hard"
to fairly weigh the evidence as a result).

This Court should

affirm the denial of Bingham's mistrial motion on this point.
C

Harmless Error.
Even if this Court could find error in the trial

court's judgment, it could not find reversal-warranting harm in
such error.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a juror's brief

view of a defendant wearing handcuffs does not require reversal
unless the defendant affirmatively proves prejudice.
P.2d at 70 (citing authorities).
Chess v. Smith,

Wetzel,

868

It so held notwithstanding

617 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah 1980), which held that

the right to be tried in non-jail attire is a constitutional
right.

Because in this case Bingham was tried in non-jail

attire, and was only viewed wearing jail garb in another court,
the Wetzel standard for harmless error applies.
Under this standard, Bingham has not shown, and cannot
show, prejudice sufficient to require reversal of his conviction.
The for-cause removal of panelist DeRosier, and the trial court's
admonition that jurors were to disregard her prior sighting of
Bingham in jail garb, adequately cured any prejudice thereby
caused.

See Menzies,

889 P.2d at 401 (applying presumption that

jurors followed admonition to disregard improper testimony).
Additionally, any such prejudice was de minimus compared to that
wrought by Bingham's own testimony.

In that testimony, Bingham

admitted heroin addiction, shoplifting, taking the Datsun and
switching its license plates, and driving while intoxicated on
21

heroin (R. 313-14, 324, 328).

In effect, he thereby stripped

away his own "garb of innocence," Kennedy

v.

Cardwell,

487 F.2d

101, 105 (6th Cir. 1973) .
In short, the jury's knowledge that Bingham had been
previously seen wearing jail clothing did not influence the
verdict in this case.9
Court in Burk

and Boone,

Putting the matter as stated by this
Bingham had a fair trial.

On this

alternative, harmless error basis, Bingham's appellate argument
on this point cannot prevail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM
Bingham's criminal convictions.

Because this case is resolvable

under already-settled law, neither oral argument nor published
opinion is necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

0^( day of August, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General

9

The same result would be reached even under the stringent,
"harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard for constitutional
error. See Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v.
Verde,
770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989). Bingham's own testimony
was so overwhelmingly self-harmful that Ms. DeRosier's prior
sighting of him, known by the jury, was trivial.
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Unloaded
firearm.
1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah
Aggravated robbery may be committed with 1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989);
387 (Utah 1977).
State v. Ruaaell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990);
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1986); SUU v. Bishop, 717 R2d 261 (Utah
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
Admissibility of expert opinion aUting
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27.
whether a particular knife waa, or could have
A X J t — Fact that gun waa unloaded as been, the weapon uaed in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 660.
507.
Key Numbers. — Robbery *» 11.

PART4
THEFT
76-6*401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property* means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(fa lb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
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(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe
to be true; or
(c) Prevents anotherfromacquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not
a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-6-401.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).

ANALYSIS

Deception.
Purpose to deprive.
Cited.
Deception.
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception"
only applies to impressions offset that are false
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of
future performance do not suffice as false representations under that* subsection. State v.
Lakey, 659 R2d 1061 (Utah 4983).
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of
"deception," the previously created or confirmed
impression of fact must be false when the
property is obtained in order to constitute "deception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1983).
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of
"deception/ a promise of future performance
can constitute deception when the promising
party does not intend to perform or knows the
promise will not be performed; a person knows
that a promise will not be performed when he is
aware that the promise is reasonably certain
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's false representations to a bank
employee about his account and line of credit at
other banks were sufficient to support finding

Purpose to deprive.
Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile
where defendant drove the automobile in excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from
police; told police when stopped that he owned
the automobile; damaged the automobile by
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to California without ever stating he would return the
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
880 (Utah 1978).
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, defendant began borrowing small amounts of
money from the victim to buy pet food; the
victim's generosity prompted defendant to
make subsequent requests for larger sums to
pay for everything from automobile repairs to
medical bills; with each request, defendant inevitably promised to repay the victim soon or by
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986,
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986).
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court properly refused to give an instruction
proffered by defendant State v. Larsen, 876
R2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

theft was committed in any manner specified in
it 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of
theft" required to be pled by this section to
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft.
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with
the general offense of theft" under } 76-6-404,
it may then present its evidence to prove the

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under $ 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-

cial anti-theft laws, $ 41-la-1308 et seq.
Shoplifting Act, } 78-11-14 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus d e l i c t i
In prosecution fbrterceny it was not essential
that corpus delicti be established by evidence
independent of that adduced to prove that defendant was perpetrator of crime; the same
evidence could be used to prove both. State v.
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494
(1944).
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of
the elements that one entitled to possession of
the property has been deprived of possession
and such deprivation has been accomplished by
a felonious taking; evidence of the property
having been taken from the possession of the
owner without his knowledge or consent is
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus
delicti. State v. Chesnut, 621 P. 2d 1228 (Utah
1980).

ANALYSIS

Bailments.
Comment on defendant's silence.
Corpus delicti.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
—Weight and sufficiency.
Included offenses.
—Possession.
Instructions.
Intent.
Pleading and practice.
Possession of recently stolen property.
"Purpose to deprive."
Separate offenses.
Unauthorized control.
Venue.
Cited.
Bailments.
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own
property, if done with intent to charge bailee.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Comment on defendant's silence.
Where defendant charged with theft of building materials from construction site did not
testify in his own defense and offered no evidence to explain his late-night presence at the
site, prosecutor's comment that: "The defense
has presented no evidence as to why defendant
was out there. What was he doing out there?"
was a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).

Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively
who the real owner of the property is, but only
that defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another. State
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977).
This section requires a finding of only one of
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; conviction for theft can be upheld without a finding
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long
as there is a finding that he "exercised unauthorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982).
Evidence.
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. Id. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
| 101.

CJ&. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 18.
Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 10.

76-6*408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the propertyfromthe owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appearsfromthe evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2Xd), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
History: C. 1963, 76-6-406, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, I 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, I 1;
1993, ch. 102, ft 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "Subsection" for "paragraph" in Subsection (2), subdivided Subsection (2Xd), moved "if the value
given for the property exceeds $20" which was
formerly in Subsection (2XdXi) to the introduc-

tory language, inserted "picture" in Subsection
(2XdXiii), redesignated former Subsections
(2XdXi) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4),
inserted Subsection (5), making a corresponding designation change, and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, ft 11-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen;
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
—Receiving stolen property.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
Intent.
Prima facie case.
Separate offenses.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is
constitutional when read in light of ft 76-1-503,
which provides that a presumption means only
that the issue of the presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless its existence is
clearly negated and that the jury may treat
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the
presumed fact, but does not disturb the requirement that the presumed fact, like all other
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454
(Utah 1976).
The phrase "believing that it probably has
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah
1976).
Applicability.
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits
its application to pawnbrokers and similar
businesses that generally deal in small purchases of secondhand consumer goods. It does
not include businesses that regularly deal in
large bulk orders of raw industrial material.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 646 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1993).
Elements.
—Concealing stolen property.
The elements in the crime of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property
are: (1) property belonging to another has been

—Receiving stolen property.
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property are.^ppQperty belonging to another has
been stolen< the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property
the defendant knew or believed the property
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely
to deprive the owner of the possession of the
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah
1980).
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential
element of the crime of receiving stolen property; state's proof that offense occurred on a
date different than that alleged in the information was not fatal to defendant's conviction for
receiving stolen property where the applicable
limitations statute had not run at the time the
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394
(Utah 1982).
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) The defendant received, retained, or disposed of the property of another, (2) knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment.
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive
female undercover police officer to sell stolen
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may
have been encouraged to suggest that his relationship with the officer become more intimate.
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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"mileage" in Subsection (l)(f); added Subsection (l)(g); and made related changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, substituted "class B" for "class A" near
the beginning of Subsection (1).
The 1992 amendment by ch. 1, effective Jano« ^0^0
L J^
^L- i-- u
uaiy30,1992,nmumber^^
formerly appeared as § 41-1-173; deleted the
subsection designation (1) at the beginning; mserted present Subsection (1); redesignated former Subsections (lKa) through (l)(g) as
present Subsections (2) through (8); substituted the present code citations in Subsections
(2) and (8) for "Section 41-1-169" and the
present code citations in Subsections (5) and (6)
for "Section 41-1-172"; deleted former Subsec-

4Ma-1311

tion (2) listing violations constituting second
degree felonies; and made stylistic changes.
The 1992 amendment by ch. 218, amending
tnis
section as renumbered and amended by
^a™ 1^92 ch. 1, effective July 1,1992 deleted
°* ° P ' ™ f „ w r t l * <**?* u*? after certificate of title in Subsection (1).
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1992, ch. 1,
^
^ wtf ^ b m ^ g B 2 9 [ c h
§ 213
2345 M o t o r V e h i c l e Business Regulation Act,
^ t h p a s 8 i n ^ 1 9 9 2 General Session, it is the
intent of the Legislature that this bill should
be amended as follows: (1) In Section
41-la-1310 '41-3-2' shall be deleted and
'41-3-301' inserted."
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch.
50, § 1; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; C. 1943,
57-3a.H0; L. 1983, ch. 190, 5 2; 1986, ch. 32,
§ 1; 198Vch. 92, § 52; C. 1953, *1£109; re"X^mSt N o ^ - V e Unamendment, effective January 30, 1992, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as
§ 41-1-109; substituted "motor vehicle, trailer,
or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three places; de-

leted former Subsection (2) which made an offense under the section a third-degree felony if
the vehicle was not returned within 24 hours;
redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as
Subsection. (2) and (3); and made stylistic
"la^&e8Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Attempts to commit crime.
Auto insurance.
—Theft."
Elements.
Jury instructions.
—Intent.
Theft.

—Lesser included offense.
Constitutionality.
Former act (Laws 1921, ch. 81) relating to
identification number on vehicles was not rendered unconstitutional as containing more
than one subject by inclusion therein of provision making it offense to drive away automobile of another. State v. Olson, 59 Utah 549,
205 P. 337 (1922).
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41-la-1313. Third degree felony to possess motor vehicle,
trailer, semitrailer, or parts without identification number — Presumption of knowledge.
(1) It is a third degree felony for a person to have in his possession any
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer, or any part or parts of a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer, from which any identification number has been removed, defaced, destroyed, obliterated, or so covered as to be concealed, or
where the identification number has been altered or changed in any manner.
(2) A person having possession of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
or part of them under this section is presumed prima facie to have knowledge
of this condition.
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, ft 113; C. 1943,
57-3a-114; L. 1989, ch. 274, § 21; C. 1953,
41-1-110; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1,
i 170.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted the
subsection designations; substituted "a third
degree felony" for "unlawful" near the beginning of Subsection (1); and made stylistic
changes.

The 1992 amendment, effective January 30,
1992, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 41-1-110; inserted "trailer, or
semitrailer" in three places; substituted "identification number" for "trademark, distinguishing or identification number, manufacturer's number, or serial number" in two
places; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-Reference*. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-fOl, 76-13-203, 76-3-301.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 61A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 688.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *» 316, 340.

41-la-1314. Third degree felony to exercise unauthorized
control for extended time.
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise unauthorized control over a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer if the person does not return the motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after
the exercise of unauthorized control.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
History: C. 1953, 41-U-1314, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 1, i 171.
Effective Date*. — Laws 1992, ch. 1 became
effective on January 30, 1992, pursuant to

Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
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